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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REPORT 
OF THE GRAND JURY; PETI-
TIONERS H. C. SHOEMAKER, 
WILLIAM A. DAWSON, PHILO T. 
FARNSWORTH, D. H. WHITTEN-
BURG, HARLEY J. CORLEISSEN, 
and LAYTON MAXFIELD; and 
PROVO CITY, a Municipal Corpor-
ation of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, in the interest 
of the GRAND JURY PRESENT-
MENT, otherwise referred to as the 
UTAH COUNTY GRAND JURY 
REPORT, 




BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS AND 
RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The case is accurately stated in Appellants' brief. How-
ever, we desire to supplement so~e of· the additional facts 
which seem to be of importance. 
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2 
In its findings under the headings noted in Appel-
lants' brief the jury freely indulged itself in commentin~ 
on the administration and operation of the institutiom 
named. It also made recommendations as to fiscal, medi-
cal, inventory, telephone service and various personnel 
matters. Much of this certainly appears to be harmless. 
However, the grand jury did not limit itself to general 
recommendations and observations-it also undertook to 
criticize and condemn the administration of some of the 
State institutions and law enforcement in Provo City. This 
condemnation either by design or inadvertence cast strong 
inference of incompetence, maladminstration and even 
possible public offenses without specifically naming the in-
dividual responsible and, in most cases, without even fix-
ing a time or place. As a result the inescapable impression 
is frequently given that present administration officials are 
at fault. 
The jury, for example, inferred immoral sex practices 
by "male employees" with "feeble-minded girls" at the 
American Fork Institution, and stated that such conduct is 
"reprehensible and should be condemned" (R. 25). No em-
ployee was named, and no time or place was fixed. It was 
simply a general castigation of "some employees" with the 
sage observation that "where there is smoke there is fire" 
(R. 26). 
The jury also reported that "we listened to testimony 
establishing that certain types of feeble-minded patients 
had been improperly housed-" and "we have heard con-
vincing proof of punishment of feeble-minded children by 
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incarcerating them in a bare room at the school-" (R. 27). 
At another point in the "presentment" the jury reported 
"There is evidence of maladministration at the American 
Fork Training School" ( R. 23) . These comments <»1. secret 
evidence or information obtained outside of the jury room 
by the grand jury were not related to any specific time or 
place or administration. 
In referring to the Road Commission, the Jury stated 
that a State Road truck had been sold by the "then District 
Superintendent to his son at a price far below its real 
value" (R. 39). Whether this "then District Superintend-
ent" is the same one whose son allegedly purchased a truck 
from the Road Commission as appears at another page in 
the "presentment" is not clear. In any event, the "then 
District Superintendent" is notnamed and no time or place 
is fixed. There are also general comments relative to "high-
ly irregular" practices. The clear inference is that the 
"highly irregular" practices were done with Commission 
approval and the jury concludes that while the acts were 
not indictable, they were "inexcusable irregularities" and 
"we strongly condemn" (R. 41). 
While the "presentment" tends to praise the officials 
of Utah County by stating "generally we find that County 
affairs have been capably and efficiently administered by 
the respective County officers * * * and we commend 
them" (R. 42), it refers to unintentional law violations, 
with comment that the grand jury has no authority to in-
dict because these violations are misdemeanors (R. 43) . 
On the other hand, in referring to law enforcement in 
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Provo City the observation is made that "the general morale 
within the Provo City Police Department seems to be at a 
low ebb" (R. 48). A reference is then made to a specific 
drunken driving case which the City Attorney is supposed 
to have improperly reduced to reckless driving. This 
specific instance was "strongly condemned" (R. 49). 
The foregoing recitations of the facts "presented" by 
the Grand Jury are simply stated to demonstrate the type 
report made, and do not include all the objectionable matter. 
POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH STATUTES DO NOT AUTHORIZE 
A GRAND JURY TO MAKE A REPORT IN 
WRITING. 
POINT II. 
rHE GREAT WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AT 
COMMON LAW DOES NOT PERMIT A GRAND 
JURY TO MAKE WRITTEN REPORTS WHICH 
CRITICIZE AND CONDEMN BUT FAIL TO IN-
DICT OR MAKE A WRITTEN ACCUSATION 
OF A PUBLIC OFFENSE UPON WHICH A 
COMPLAINT MAY ISSUE. 
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ARGUMENT 
Introduction, definitions, and statutory provisions. 
The Utah statutes do not in any way use or refer to 
the word "presentment." The only use of this word appears 
in the Utah Constitution, wherein it is provided: 
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in land or naval forces or in the Militia when 
in actual service in time of war or public danger." 
Undoubtedly the use of this word as set out in the 
Constitution necessarily implies its common law meaning, 
which in turn presupposes grand jury action. See Eason 
v. State, 11 Ark. ( 6 England) 481, 482. 
Historically, at common law a presentment was pre-
pared by the grand jury whereas an indictment was pre-
pared by the King's counsel. The presentment differed from 
the indictment in form only. It was in fact an informal 
accusation of a crime in writing addressed to the attorney 
general. On this "presentment" the attorney general based 
an indictment. See In re Gardiner, infra, and Words and 
Phrases, volume 33, page 457 and following. 
A so-called "presentment" not dealing with public of-
fenses or crimes, but dealing generally with administrative 
matters, and condemning and censuring without actually 
accusing of a public offense was not tolerated at English 
Common law. It is true, as indicated by Appellants in their 
brief, that for a time there were isolated instances of public 
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censure of constables and criticism of road conditions by 
Grand Juries. However, even these isolated instances are 
not applicable precedents because the limited practice was 
abolished by statute. W. S. Holdsworth in Vol X of A 
History of English Law, page 150 states: 
"Nevertheless this modified system of present-
ment by high and petty constables lasted till 1827, 
when it was abolished by a statute passed in that 
year." 
At page 151 of the same Volume he states: 
"The use of the machinery of presentment to 
enforce duties to repair highways was abolished in 
1835." 
Inasmuch as the statutes of England, insofar as they 
are applicable to general common law principles became a 
part of the common law, it must be concluded that as early 
as 1835 presentments of the typ,e referred to by Appellants 
in their brief were in fact not permitted. 
The word "presentment" then, as it refers to anything 
less than a crime or public offense is actually a misnomer. 
Certainly, the written report of a grand jury publicly made, 
dealing with administrative matters and condemning or 
censuring without in fact charging a public offense is not, 
properly speaking, a presentment as it was known at com-
mon law. 
The question then in reality, is not whether the grand 
jury is authorized to make a so-called "presentment," but 
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whether or not it can make a written report, not charging 
an offense, but condemning public officials generally. 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH STATUTES DO NOT AUTHORIZE 
A GRAND JURY TO MAKE A REPORT IN 
WRITING. 
There are several statutes specifically dealing with a 
grand jury's rights and obligations relative to its report to 
the court. 105-19-1 of Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides 
as follows: 
"The Grand Jury must inquire into all public 
offenses within the jurisdiction of the court com-
mitted or triable within the county, and present 
them to the court by indictment or by an accusation 
in writing." 
It will be observed 'that both "indictment" and "accu-
sation in writing" refer to "public offenses." 
In 105-7-2 the legislature has further indicated what 
is meant by an "accusation in writing." That statute is as 
follows: 
"An accusatiq_n in writing against any district, 
county, precinct or municipal officer, or an officer 
of any board of education, for any high crime, mis-
demeanor or malfeasance in office may be presented 
to the district court by the Grand Jury or by the 
district attorney or by the county attorney of the 
county in which the officer accused was .elected or 
appointed. 
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The next section, 105-7-3, provides: 
"The accusation must state the offense charged 
in ordinary and concise language." 
The statutes then provide that the accusation in writ-
ing be presented by the foreman to the court and filed with 
the clerk (105-7-4). The next section provides for the ap-
pearance of the defendant to answer the charge (105-7-5). 
Thus the statutes in our state provide for indictment 
or written accusation charging either a crime or a mal-
feasance for which removal wUllie. 
Other Utah statutes relating to the question are as fol-
lows: 
105-19-3: 
"In the investigation of a charge for the pur-
pose of indictment the Grand Jury must receive no 
other evidence than such as shall be given by wit-
nesses produced and sworn before them. * * * 
The Grand Jury must receive none but legal evidence 
and the best evidence and degree to the exclusion of 
hearsay or secondary evidence." 
Section 105-19-5 provides: 
"The Grand Jury ought to find an indictment 
when all the evidence before them taken together if 
unexplained or uncontradicted would, in their judg-
ment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury." 
Section 105-19-7 specifically directs the grand jury to 
inquire into the case of * * * 
"every person imprisoned in jails of the county on 
a criminal charge and not indicted or informed 
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against, into the conditions and management of the 
public prisons within the county; and into the wil-
fuU and corrupt misconduct in office of public offi-
cers of every description within the county." 
105-19-7 has a historical background. Inspection of the 
jails was made a specific duty to correct two possible 
abuses: 1. Holding prisoners without bail or charge, and, 
2, detecting cruel and inhuman punishments. 
The provision relating to wilful and corrupt misconduct 
in office of public officers of course relates to either a 
specific public offense or a malfeasance in office. · Mal-
feasance in office is, by definition, wilful and corrupt. (So 
held in Attwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 Pac. 2d 377.) 
Thus in Bryant v. Crossland, 206 S. W. 791, 182 Ky. 
556, the Kentucky Supreme Court said that misfeasance and 
malfeasance in office are public offenses. Misfeasance and 
Malfeasance in office, while not specifically defined by our 
statutes, are considered public offenses. Thus in 105-7-2, 
supra, the grand jury is specifically empowered to make an 
accusation in writing relative to malfeasance in office. 
What is a public offense? Of course, it is not that which 
a grand jury or any other group believes is censurable. It is 
that which the law. has made a crime or one for which 
removal will lie. Thus in West v. Territory, Arizona, 36 P. 
207, 4 Ariz. 212, the Arizona Supreme Court said that the 
term "public offense" has the same meaning as "crime." 
In Oleson v. Pincock, 251 P. 23, 68 Utah 507, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "public offense," as used in Com-
piled Laws of 1917, Section 8714, authorizing arrest without 
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warrant for public offenses committed in an officer's pres-
ence, includes every such offense constituting misdemeanors 
and not merely breaches of the peace, for which an arrest 
can be made in the officer's presence under common law. 
It must, therefore, be concluded that the Utah statutes 
do not authorize a grand jury to do more than indict or 
make a written accusation, charging a specific puolic of-
fense involving wilful and corrupt misconduct. 
POINT II. 
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AT 
COMMON LAW DOES NOT PERMIT A GRAND 
JURY TO 1\iAKE WRITTEN REPORTS WHICH 
CRITICIZE AND CONDEMN BUT FAIL TO IN-
DICT OR MAKE A WRITTEN ACCUSATION 
OF A PUBLIC OFFENSE UPON WHICH A 
COMPLAINT MAY ISSUE. 
Clearly, the English common law did not provide for 
written reports to be made by the grand jury. Further-
more, a "presentment" was never a written report comment-
ing on matters generally. It was a written accusation ad-
dressed to the prosecuting attorney charging a crime. See 
supra. Of course, under a practice which permits and 
authorizes the prosecuting attorney to sit with the grand 
jury, there is no need for the jury to address written 
communications to him, as there was under the old English 
common law system. The grand jury now consults with the 
District Attorney and frames an indictment in the first 
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instance. It would seem, therefore, that the necessary con-
clusion which must be reached is that at English common 
law written reports commenting generally on administra-
tive matters and censuring and condemning public officers 
without charging a specific public offense were unknown. 
Furthermore, a "presentment" was not a written report. 
It was a written accusation charging a crime upon which 
an indictment could be based. Therefore, so far as the Eng-
lish common law is concerned, the use of the word "pre-
sentment" to identify a written report on general conditions, 
is a complete misnomer. 
88-2-1 of the Utah Code provides as follows: 
"The common law of England insofa'r as it is 
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States, or the Constitu-
tion or laws of this State, and so far only as it is 
consistent with and adapted to the natural and phy-
sical conditions of this State and the necessities of 
the people thereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be 
the rule of decision of all courts of this State." 
If this statute be construed as adopting the English 
common law as distinguished from common law generally 
as it existed in 1896, it must of course be concluded that 
there is neither statutory nor common law authority for 
a written report identified as a "presentment" or otherwise 
which does not charge a public offense upon which a com-
plaint or an indictment may be laid. 
7 The cases in New York are discussed herein at some 
length because of the development in the law which has 
taken place before that court. Originally the New York 
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courts held that a motion to expunge the report of a grand 
jury which criticized and condemned individuals without 
charging a public offense upon which an indictment could 
be based would be denied on the grounds that a grand jury 
had authority to make such a report because of its broad 
inquisitorial powers. The first case of importance so hold-
ing was In re Jones, 92 N. Y. Supp. 275., It has frequently 
been quoted as a landmark case and Respondents believe 
has erroneously been relied upon~ In that case the grand 
jury made a report criticizing the actions of the clerk of a 
Board of Supervisors of Nassau County. This clerk made 
a motion to set aside and quash the "presentment," which 
motion was denied. The Supreme Court of New York, Ap-
pellate Division, in January, 1905, affirmed the action of 
the lower court with one justice dissenting. In the majority 
opinion, the court said : 
"I think, therefore, that any final finding upon 
the exercise of these inquisitorial powers may be 
called a presentment, and that it may be regarded 
as final, and not improper, because an indictment 
cannot or does not follow it. While it is true that 
the Code of Criminal Procedure does not in terms 
provide for a report as the result of this inquiry nor 
directly provide for a presentment, yet it is signifi-
cant that the term is used in contradistinction to an 
indictment in section 250, which reads as follows: 
"'The grand jury must appoint one of their 
number as clerk, who is to preserve minutes of 
their proceedings (except of the votes of the 
individual members on a presentment or indict-
ment), and of the evidence given before them.' 
""* * * but, while a report or presentment 
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of a grand jury neither calls upon a person nor 
suffers him to answer, it may be that the court in 
its inherent power might, on the application of one 
aggrieved, refer or resubmit the matter to the fur-
ther inquiry of the grand jury, or of a grand jury, 
in order that justice be done after a full hearing. 
I think that if under the guise of a presentment, the 
grand jury simply accuse, thereby compelling the 
accused to stand mute, where the presentment would 
warrant indictment so that the accused might an-
swer, the presentment may be expunged; but I do 
not think that a presentment as a report upon the 
exercise of inquisitorial powers must be stricken out 
if it incidentally points out that this or that public 
official is responsible for omissions or commissions, 
negligence or defects." 
Justice Woodward, who was the dissenting Justice, 
disapproved of the majority ruling and commented at some 
length on the common law background and his reasons for 
holding that such a report was not authorized and should 
be expunged on proper motion. (His dissenting opinion is 
herein quoted at some length because it is Respondents' 
opinion that this opinion more nearly represents what the 
law has become in New York State, and that it has been 
frequently quoted in the cases which represent the great 
weight of authority in this country) At page 278 he states: 
"* * * In determining the powers of the 
grand jury under the laws of this state, whether 
regulated by statute or usage constituting the com-
mon law, we have a right to consider what that body 
might do under this indefinite power of making 
presentments if that power be conceded. If it has 
the right to censure the petitioners in the matter 
now before us, it is difficult to conceive of any limi-
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tation upon the powers of the grand jury. It may 
establish its own standards of right and wrong, and 
may subject the citizen to the odium of a judicial 
condemnation without giving him the slightest op-
portunity to be heard; oftentimes working, in the 
public estimate, as great an injury to his standing 
and character as though he had in fact been accused 
of a crime. This is a perversion of the essential 
spirit of the grand jury system, which had for its 
object the protection of the citizen against an open 
and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, 
expense, and anxiety of a public trial, before a prob-
able cause is established by the presentment and in-
dictment. Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329, 344. It 
cannot be that it was ever contemplated that this 
body, created for the protection of the citizen, was 
to have the power to set up its own standards of 
public or private morals, and to arraign citizens at 
the bar of public opinion, without responsibility for 
its abuse of that power, and without giving to the 
citizen the right to a trial upon the accusations. , _ 
/* * * * *'·, I ) . 
"There 'are two great purposes-one to bring to 
trial those who are properly charged with crime, the 
other to protect the citizen against unfounded accu-
sation of crime. When the grand jury goes beyond 
this, and attempts to set up its own standards, and 
to administer punishment in the way of public. cen-
sure, it is defeating the very purposes it was in-
tended to conserve; and its action cannot, therefore, 
be lawful. Section 6 of article 1 of the state Consti-
tution provides that 'no person shall be held to an-
swer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime 
* * * unless on presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury, and in any trial in any court whatever 
the party accused shall be allowed to appear and 
defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions.' 
*. * * -In other words, a 'presentment on indict-
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ment,' as applied to the citizen by our Constitution, 
contemplates, in substance, the same thing. It con-
templates an accusation of crime, to be followed by 
an answer on the part of the person thus formally 
accused, with an opportunity to be heard in his own 
defense before a jury of his peers. The terms are, 
in their relation to the individual, synonymous. No 
one would contend that a citizen could be indicted for 
anything less than a crime, or that, if indicted, he 
could be denied an opporunity to answer and to ap-
pear in his own defense before a iury; and it seems 
to be equally clear that there is no constitutional 
right to make a presentment against an individual 
in a case where an indictment would not lie. The 
rights of the citizen are the same under either an in-
dictment or a presentment. There is the right to 
answer and to appear in person and by counsel, and 
to have a trial by jury in any case in which an in-
dictment might properly be made . . 'An indictment 
is an accusation in writing, presented by a grand 
iury to a competent court, charging a person with a 
crime.' * * *" 
At page 280 the dissenting Justice said : 
"* * * If there has been no crime or offense, 
the grand jury, designed for the protection of the 
citizen, has no right to create an offense unknown to 
the law for the purpose of administering punishment 
by way of censure, for this a 'government of laws, 
not of men,' to quote the preamble of the Constitu-
tion of Massachusetts and the language of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 163, 
2 L. Ed. 60. The rule is not different because the 
accusation takes the form of a presentment rather 
than of an indictment, which as I have already sug-
gested, are synonymous terms as used in our iuris-
prudence, and particularly so since the adoption of 
our Code of Criminal Procedure * * * If the 
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acts charged do not constitute a crime, then there 
is no indictment before the court, and the petitioners 
clearly have a right to be relieved of the odium of a 
judicial censure, where the document in which such 
censure is contained is a mere impertinence, without 
authority of law. * * *" 
In an earlier New York case, In re Gardiner, decided 
in 1900, and cited in 31 Misc. 364, 64 N. Y. Supp. 760, the 
l grand jury made a "presentment" criticizing the District Attorney. The District Attorney made a motion to set aside 
or quash. The court, in granting the motion, said: 
"Sometimes, however, our grand juries make a 
sort of general presentment of evil and evil things 
to call public attention to them, yet not an instruction 
for any specific indictment. No one could be called 
to answer to such a presentment. * * * While 
it may be observed that the court had tolerated rather 
than sanctioned such presentments of things general, 
yet the grand jury should never, under cover of a 
presentment, present an individual in this manner; 
for if it have legal evidence of the commission of a 
crime, it should find an indictment against him upon 
which he could be held to answer, and if it have no 
such evidence, it ought, in fairness, to be silent. The 
powers of the grand jury extend only to questions of 
crime. Its functions are not executive, but judicial. 
It is in fact a preliminary tribunal, and it is fur-
nished with inquisitorial powers only for the purpose) 
of examining into crimes." 
The next case of importance after the Jones case was 
Re Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N. Y. Supp. 313, decided in 
1910. In that case the grand jury had filed a report re-
flecting upon the professional integrity of the prosecuting 
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attorney. He had made a motion to strike from the record. 
The court in sustaining his motion said : 
"It has become a custom of almost invariable' 
occurrence that the grand jury, at the close of its 
term, makes a presentment on some subject on which, 
frequently, no evidence has been heard. This, no 
doubt, proceeds from the zeal of its members to pro-
mote the general welfare by calling attention to cer-
tain conditions which they believe should be reme-
died. So long as they are confined to matters of 
general interest they are regarded as harmless, even 
though a waste of time and effort, and after the 
ephemeral notice of the day has passed they are al-
lowed a peaceful rest. But it is very different when 
the motives and conduct of the individual are im-
pugned, and he held to reprobation, without an op-
portunity to defend or protect his name and reputa-
tion, for it must be borne in mind that if the gentle-
men of the grand jury were to meet as an association 
of individuals and give expression to the sentiments 
contained in a presentment, little attention would be 
paid to them, and a healthy regard for the responsi-
bility of utterances injurious to the individual would, 
in all probability, restrain exaggerated and un-
founded statements. The mischief arises from a prev-
alent belief that a grand jury making the conven-
tional presentment speaks with great authority, and 
acts under the sanction of the court, thereby giving 
to its deliverance a solemnity which impresses the 
mind of the public. This is a grave error. The pow-
ers and duties of a grand jury are defined by law. 
No matter how respectable or eminent citizens may 
be who comprise the grand jury, they are not above 
the law, and the people have not delegated to them 
arbitrary or plenary powers to do that, under an 
ancient form, which they have not a legal right to do." 
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The court in the Osborne case, supra, referred to the 
Jones case, supra, and after discussing the majority opinion 
remarked that the dissenting opinion of Justice Woodward 
was founded on better reason and then ordered that the 
paper entitled a "presentment" be stricken and expunged 
from the Tecords. The court in the Osborne case thus re-
pudiated the majority opinion in the Jones case and adopted 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Woodward.( \ 
I q o~ 
In re Hafernan, 125 N.Y. S~pp. 737,1'he grand j~ry had 
made a presentment charging certain borough officials with 
neglect of their duties and of the public interest. A motion 
was made to set aside and expunge this from the record on 
the ground that it was "inadvisedly made by the grand jury 
in excess of its powers." The court in granting the motion 
said: 
"* * * They are not part of the administra-
tive government of a great municipality. They have 
the fullest and amplest power to investigate, as it is 
their solemn and prescribed duty to do, into 'the 
wilful and corrupt misconduct in office, of public 
officers of every description, in the county.' Finding 
any such evidence of wilful and corrupt misconduct, 
it would be their clear duty to indict. Then the offi-
cial could have his day in court, where he would 
receive either the condemnation which he deserved 
if his actions have been unlawful, or the vindication 
that he would desire in case he was blameless. From 
a grand jury, obviously nothing but the fairest con-
sideration of any questions submitted to them is ex-
pected. The Star Chamber of the olden days no 
longer exists, and any action on the part of a grand 
jury which would partake of the character of the 
proceedings of that anci~nt and abhorred system 
would not be tolerated today." 
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To the same effect see Re Crosby (1925) 126 Misc. 
250, 213 N.Y. S. 86, Re Funston (1929) 133 Misc. 620, 233 
N.Y. S. 81, People v. McCabe (1933) 148 Misc. 330, 266 
N.Y. S. 363, andRe Wilcox (1934) 153 Misc. 761, 276 N. 
Y. S. 117. In all these cases the court expunged from the 
record a so-called "presentment". 
In the Crosby case, supra, the court expunged from the 
records a grand jury report which lauded the high char-
acter of certain officials but at the same time criticized them 
for the prevalence of gambling and houses of prostitution. 
The presentment apparently also contained numerous phil-
osophical observances. 
In the Funston case, supra, the court indicated that a 
"presentment" could not be used by the grand jury to attack 
the name of a citizen or to charge a public official with 
misconduct without giving him a chance to be heard. The 
court, therefore, expunged the presentment. 
In the McCabe case, supra, the court, in expunging the 
"presentment" from the record· said : 
"A presentment is a foul blow. It wins the im-
portance of a judicial document; yet it lacks its 
principal attributes-the right to answer and to ap-
peal. It accuses, but furnishes no forum for a denial. 
No one knows upon what evidence the findings are 
based. An indictment may be challenged-even de-
feated. The presentment is immune. It is like the 
'hit and run' motorist. Before application can be 
made to suppress it, it is the subject of public gossip. 
The damage is done. The injury it may unjustly in-
flict may never be healed." 
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In the Wilcox case, supra, the presentment charged 
gross irregularities on the part of certain election inspec-
tors. This was ordered expunged on petition of one of the 
inspectors involved. 
In the Healey case, 293 N.Y. S. 584, a New York Court 
by dicta indicated that because of New York statutes and 
broad inquisitorial powers of grand juries in that jurisdic-
tion could make a written report criticizing public officials 
but not private individuals. The motion to expunge was 
granted and the court indulged in strong language criticiz-
ing a "presentment" which referred to the private indi-
vidual. The writer is at a loss to understand the distinction 
drawn by the dicta used. In any event the N. Y. statutes 
apparently do not provide for removal proceedings for 
conduct of public officials who are guilty of wilfull and 
corrupt misconduct. In Utah the statutes so provide so that 
even the New York dicta is not applicable. 
The Jones case, supra, went to the New York Supreme 
Court, which court refused to review because it claimed 
lack of jurisdiction. 
Thus in New York the numerical majority of the courts 
follow the dissenting opinion in the Jones case, and one 
court, perhaps two, by dicta, follow the majority opinion. 
It therefore, of course, must be concluded that there is no 
settled law in New York, and any decision relied upon from 
that jurisdiction is unreliable, and certainly is not the law, 
even in that state. 
There is a California case . which seems to collaterally 
hold, at least by way of ·dicta, that the grand jury has a 
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right to make a so-called "presentment". That case is Irwin 
v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 657, 19 P. (2d) 292. This case was 
an action for libel based upon the report of a grand jury in-
vestigating the death of a professional boxer. The report 
criticized the boxing officials, referees and promoters. One 
of the offended parties brought an action for libel and 
slander. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint 
on the ground that the publication of the grand jury was 
privileged. This was the only question which was directly 
before the court. 
The California case, supra, and one or two of the New 
York cases which seem to follow the majority opinion in 
the Jones case, supra apparently make up Appellants' case 
authorities. The Jones case is not controlling New York 
law, and the other cases involve collateral matters and there-
fore rulings which did not arise out of direct attacks. On 
the other hand, all the other cases which counsel can find, 
and which arise out of direct attacks, as in the instant case, 
have squarely ruled that the grand jury may not make 
written reports which do not charge a public offense. 
In Ex parte Robinson decided in January, 1936, 165 
So. 582, 231 Ala. 503, the Alabama Supreme Court had be-
fore it this same question. There the grand jury had criti-
cized the conduct of the City Commissioner but had re-
turned no indictment. The Commission had moved the Cir-
cuit Court to expunge from its records the grand jury's re-
port. The Alabama Circuit Court reviewed the cases and 
indicated that there was no question but that the Circuit 
Court had the power to expunge the report and that it 
should have done so. It therefore issued a writ of man-
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damus ordering the court to do so. The Alabama court 
referred to the California case of Irwin v. Murphy, supra, 
and said: 
"* * * That opinion also justifies grand 
juries in making such reports. That is the only case 
we have seen which does so (not subsequently over-
ruled), but the question was collateral, as in our 
Parsons Case, supra, which does not, as we have 
shown, go the extent of saying that the grand jury 
has that legal right." 
The court then went on to comment on the great weight 
of authority and said: 
"On the other hand, where the question has 
arisen on direct attack, as here, with one accord, the 
cases hold that the officer when he is thus criticized 
has the right in such a proceeding as this to have the 
report expunged. In one case it is thus expressed: 
'While it may be observed that the court has toler-
ated, rather than sanctioned, such presentments of 
things general, yet the grand jury should never, un-
der cover of a presentment, present an individual in 
this manner for, if it have legal evidence of the com-
mission of the crime, it should find an in.dictment 
against him upon which he could be held to answer, 
and, if it have no such evidence, it ought, in fairness, 
to be silent.' * * *" (Italics added.) 
One of the cases most often quoted on the proposition 
that a grand jury has no right to make a "presentment" is 
the case of Bennett v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, decided . 
in Michigan in 1914, 182 Mich. 200, 150 N. W. 141. In that 
case the grand jury made a written report to the Circuit 
Court in which they criticized the conduct of the prosecut-
ing attorney. They did not return an indictment against 
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him. He requested the Supreme Court for a writ of man-
damus to compel the Circuit Judge to strike from the files 
of the court the grand jury's report. The court granted the 
writ of mandamus and said : 
"A review of all the cases cited upon both sides 
of the question, and such others as we have been 
able to examine, leads 'US to the conclusion that in-
herently, apart from statutory sanction, the grand 
jury has no right to file such a report, unless it is 
followed by an indictment. The evils of the contrary 
practice must be apparent to all. While the proceed-
ings of the grand jury are supposed to be secret, it 
is clear that in the present instance that secrecy was 
not inviolate, for the objectionable report found its 
way into the press of Kalamazoo within a few hours 
after it had been filed. Whether the matter con-
tained in such report be true or false, it can make 
no difference with the principle involved. In either 
event the accused person is obliged to submit to the 
odium of a charge or charges based, perhaps, upon 
insufficient evidence, or no evidence at all, without 
having the opportunity to meet his accusers and reply 
to their attacks. This situation is one which offends 
every one'·s sense of fair play and is surely not con-
ducive to the decent administration of justice. Upon 
the coming in of said report, we are of the opinion, 
that it was the duty of the trial court to have refused 
to accept it, or file it with the records of his court. 
Having received and filed it, upon the application of 
the petitioner, it was plainly his duty to have ex-
punged it from the files. The writ will issue as 
prayed." (Italics added.) 
In Re Report of Grand Jury of Baltimore City, de-
cided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 1927, 152 
Mary. 616, 137 A. 370, the grand jury made a final report 
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to the court containing the criticism of the methods of con-
struction and the material used in the Clifton Park High 
School. It also alleged lack of proper supervision in the con-
struction and made recommendations as to how such work 
should be done in the future. Some of those offended by the 
order made a motion to expunge the report from the record. 
The lower court refused to grant the motion and on appeal 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed many of the 
cases, citing with approval those cases holding that a grand 
jury has no right to make a "presentment" which does not 
constitute, for practical purposes, an indictment. The court 
also pointed out that a "presentment" and an indictment as 
defined at common law were practically the same thing ex-
cept that a "presentment" was an informal charge made by 
the grand jury to the prosecuting attorney upon which pre-
sentment the prosecuting attorney could base an indictment 
and that the use of the word "presentment" to identify a 
written report of a grand jury which does not charge in 
indictable offense is in fact a misnomer. The court said : 
"The report in the present case does not charge 
any violation of law, but is a censure of the conduct 
of persons engaged in the public business, inpugning 
their integrity and fairness and pointing them out 
as public servants whose official acts should merit 
condemnation at the hands of the people. The func-
tion of the grand jury is to investigate violations of 
the criminal law, and in performing this function 
their inquisitorial powers are unlimited. If, how-
ever, having exercised these powers in any given 
case, there is lacking sufficient evidence to indict, 
their duty in that particular case ceases, and, under 
their oath, nothing transpiring within their body 
should be made public. It is apparent that this should 
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be so, for the protection of the good name and rep-
utation of the people, otherwise a condition would 
exist which the establishment and zealous mainten-
ance of the grand jury was intended to prevent; 
namely, that of having an individual publicly charged 
with misconduct without probable cause. If there 
is sufficient evidence of the commission of a crime, 
it is the duty of the grand jury to indict, that is, 
to take such action as will bring the party to trial ; 
if there is not, the citizens are and should go pro-
tected against accusations by that body which do not 
mount up to a criminal offense." 
In State v. Bramlett, decided in 1932 by the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina, 166 S. C. 323, 164 S. E. 873, the 
grand jury made a report which they called a "presentment" 
in which they cited alleged misconduct of the sheriff. He 
made a motion to strike on the grounds that the grand jury 
had no authority to make such a "presentment". The Su-
preme Court of South Carolina clearly held that a grand 
jury had no authority to make such so-called "present-
ments" -that the only presentment they could make ·was 
one stating a public offense upon which an indictment could 
be drawn. 
"But a grand jury transcends its powers and 
exceeds its duty when in its presentment it expresses 
its opinion of the force and effect of the evidence 
which it has heard, ex parte, or has itself collected 
in its investigations, or when it discusses that evi-
dence, andjor, when it presents an officer or person 
by name, and with words of censure and reprobation, 
without presenting him for indictment, or without 
finding a true bill against him on a bill of indictment 
in its hands. Even then it should be careful to 
refrain from any expression of opinion of the guilt 
of the person, or any words of condemnation. The 
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reason for this rule of law is obvious. (Italics 
added.) 
* * * * * 
"These rights and guaranties would be denied 
him if the grand jury in its presentment to the court 
could prejudge the question of his guilt or innocence 
by the expression or suggestion of the strength of 
the evidence which its investigation has disclosed. 
Its province is to present the person for the definite 
crime to which it thinks the evidence points, with 
the names of the witnesses, andjor the documentary 
evidence in proof of the charge. If the grand jurors 
are acting on an indictment already given them, 
their return of 'True Bill' or 'No Bill' expresses their 
prima facie reaction to the ex parte evidence. Be-
yond this they have no right nor power to go." 
In Re Grand Jury Report decided by the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin in 1931, 204 Wis. 409, 235 N. W. 789, 
the grand jury made a report in which it criticized the 
conduct of a certain individual without returning an in-
dictment against him. This individual made an application 
to expunge and strike the report from the record which 
motion the lower court denied. The Supreme Court of Wis-
consin, on appeal reversed the case and directed the lower 
court to expunge the report from the files. The court, in 
making its decision, said : 
"The controlling issue involved in this appeal is 
whether or not the grand jurors had the right to 
file the report in question with the court. The peti-
tioner urges that the report should have been stricken 
out in its entirety or at least those portions thereof 
which he claims refer to him, the portions being 
specifically set out in the petition which he filed. 
This raises the question as to whether or not a grand 
jury has legal authority to file a report other than 
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the report of progress and the returning of indict-
ments. It is a fact that at various times courts have 
accepted such reports made by grand juries, and this 
seems to have been done upon the theory presented 
and very ably discussed by the learned trial court 
in his opinion at the time of his decision upon peti-
tioner's application. At times these reports have gone 
unchallenged. At other times they have been chal-
lenged, and requests have been made to strike them 
from the files. When an issue has been joined, the 
rulings of courts of last resort in the vast majority 
of instances have been to the effect that a grand jury 
has no authority to make a report criticizing indi-
viduals either by name or by inference, and that the 
grand jury's powers and authority are limited to 
those conferred upon it by law." (Italics added.) 
The court then cited with approval the many other 
cases holding that a grand jury has no right to make writ-
ten reports criticizing the conduct of individuals without 
in fact returning a true bill or indictment against such in-
dividuals. 
The appellant has cited as authority a Florida case, In 
Re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 11 So. (2nd) 316. 
In this case the jury addressed a written report to the Gov-
ernor urging the removal of a public officer for his mis-
conduct in office. The majority of the Florida Supreme 
Court would not grant a motion to expunge and said : 
"* * * Their investigation must be directed 
to detecting unlawful offenses; they will not be per-
mitted to become the tool of blocs and groups to pry 
into personal affairs or to oppress some one. Neither 
will they be permitted to speak of the general quali-
fication or moral fitness of one to hold an office or 
position but whether or not a county office is being 
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conducted according to law and good morals is at all 
times within the jurisdiction of the grand jury to 
investigate. When they find that the law has been 
violated, it is their duty to indict but when they. find 
charges made to be without foundation, it is as much 
their duty to exonerate as it is to indict in the first 
instance. * * *" (Italics added.) 
Two of the judges dissented from even this limited 
"presentment" on the grounds that the grand jury had no 
authority but to indict and said: 
"It appears to be the theory, upon which all the 
cases hereinbefore referred to were decided, that it 
· is beyond the province of a grand jury to present an 
officer or other person by name and with words of 
censure and reprobation without presenting him for 
indictment, because to do so is to besmirch and hold 
to reprobation the accused without opportunity to 
defend or protect his name and reputation." 
This case is at most authority for the proposition that 
a written report may be made charging misconduct in of-
fice upon which a removal may be based. Two of the jus-
tices dissented to even this limited right to present. 
The right of a grand jury to make "presentments" 
which do not charge a public offense but simply censure, is 
discussed in three American Law Report Annotations: 22 
A. L. R. 1366, 106 A. L. R. 1388, 120 A. L. R. 437. In 106 
A. L. R. 1388 the commentator states the general rule as 
follows: 
"A person censured, criticized, or ridiculed in a· 
report by a grand jury, or of a committee appointed 
by it, may have the report expunged from the offi-
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cial records where it does not amount to an indict-
ment or presentment. * * *" 
In commenting on this quotation it is important to 
point out that the word "presentment" is used in its com-
mon law sense, that is, a written charge by the grand jury 
to the prosecuting attorney, charging a public offense, and 
not a written report censuring public officials for matters 
which do not constitute public offenses or do not constitute 
actions upon which a removal proceeding may be based. 
· The general rule is also stated in Volume 24, American 
Jurisprudence, at page 859, as follows : 
"A presentment is distinguished from an indict-
ment in that the former is an informal accusation, 
made by the grand jury on its own knowledge, to be 
used by the prosecutor as the basis for a true bill 
or indictment. In its stricter meaning, a presentment 
has· been said to be an accusation by the grand jury 
sua sponte, made ex mero motu, whereas an indict-
ment is a written accusation, preferred to the grand 
jury and presented upon oath at the instance of the 
government. Although presentments or reports may 
be returned in those cases authorized by statute, it 
appears that the practice has largely fallen into dis-
use in this country; and in the absence of statute, \ 
a grand jury has no right to file a report reflecting 
on the character of conduct of public officers or citi-
zens, unless it is followed by an indictment. It is the 
right of a person censured or criticized by a report 
of the grand jury to have it expunged from the offi-
cial records. A libel may be predicated on a report 
not amounting to an indictment or presentment, since 
such report, being extrajudicial, is not privileged, 
although there is some authority that a report filed 
in good faith is not actionable without proof of · 
malice. * * *" 
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The Indiana Supreme Court has held with the courts 
herein relied on. See Coons v. State, 191 Indiana 580, 134 
N. E. 194, wherein a report charging a judge with bias 
and with favoring criminals and calling for his resignation 
was held unauthorized. 
CONCLUSION 
From the historical and statutory viewpoint it must 
be concluded that, with the exception of the Jones case and 
the one or two New York cases that indirectly seem to 
follow the majority opinion of that decision, and with the 
exception of the Irwin and New Jersey case, which were 
actions for libel, there is no authority which will support 
a grand jury report which holds up for ridicule and public 
censure individuals and public officials without giving them 
a right to defend. On the other hand, all other authorities 
in many jurisdictions where the question has arisen, di-
rectly, have repudiated this unfair practice and have 
granted motions to expunge or quash or strike the report 
so made. 
We therefore respectfully submit that this Court should 
affirm the decision of the lower court. 
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